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From Camp David to Wye: Changing assumptions in Arab-Israeli negotiations
Article in The Middle East Journal · June 1999
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From Camp David to Wye: Changing Assumptions in Arab-Israeli Negotiations
Author(s): Shibley Telhami
Source: Middle East Journal, Vol. 53, No. 3, Special Issue on Israel (Summer, 1999), pp. 379-
392
Published by: Middle East Institute
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FROM CAMP DAVID TO WYE: CHANGING
ASSUMPTIONS IN ARAB-ISRAELI
NEGOTIATIONS
Shibley Telhami
Over the past 25 years, the negotiating assumptions of Arabs and Israelis have
changed in a manner consequentialfor their negotiating tactics and strategies. This
article examines how Arabs and Israelis have perceived the role of the United States
in Arab-Israeli negotiations, and how each party viewed the role of the domestic
politics of the other in these negotiations. Specifically, it relates the conduct of the
negotiations to the ability of each party to understand and adjust to change in
domestic politcs.
Between the Camp David Accords in 1978 and the Wye River agreement in 1998, the
negotiating assumptions of Arabs and Israelis changed in ways that affected the two
parties’ behavior. It is the aim of this article to reflect on two primary areas of change:
perceptions of the role of the United States in the Arab-Israeli peace process, and
perceptions by each party-Arab and Israeli-of the role of the other’s domestic politics
in the negotiations.
PERCEPTIONS OF THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES
In the early days of the Clinton Administration, conventional wisdom saw it as the
most Israel-friendly Administration ever. Both in its rhetoric and behavior, the Adminis-
Shibley Telhami holds the Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Development at the University of Maryland,
College Park.
MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL * VOLUME 53, NO. 3, SUMMER 1999
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380 * MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL
tration bolstered this perception. Quickly, President Bill Clinton became one of the most
admired men in Israel. No other president visited Israel more often. Diplomatically, no
other issue of US foreign policy received greater attention than Arab-Israeli peace.
Yet, midway through his second term, President Clinton was being called pro-
Palestinian by some Israeli and US critics. Palestinian National Authority President Yasir
‘Arafat seemed more welcome in the White House than the prime minister of Israel. The
State Department found itself in the unusual position of defending Palestinian compliance
with signed agreements and criticizing Israel for lack of compliance. How can one explain
this contrast?
The author’s intent in this section is to assess how Arabs and Israelis have viewed the
American role in the negotiations since the Camp David Accords between Israel and
Egypt in 1978, and to assess the changes in both perceptions and behavior. In particular,
the article will examine the changing Arab and Israeli views on the nature of the US role
(“mediator” or “partner”); on the extent to which US domestic politics mattered in the
formation of US policy toward the Middle East; and the degree to which US strategic
calculations implied support for Israel’s position in the negotiations.
Although the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991 changed Arab and Israeli
expectations of the US role in the negotiations in important ways, Egypt already behaved
toward the United States as if the Cold War was over by the mid-1970s. It is thus useful
to contrast Egyptian and Israeli expectations of the US role in the Camp David
negotiations in the 1970s, with the Arab and Israeli perceptions of the American role in
the 1990s.
The Central Role of the United States at Camp David
As soon as the confrontation between Egypt and Israel moved to the diplomatic front
following the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat believed that the
United States held “99 percent of the cards.”‘ Egypt’s approach to the United States was
predicated on the assumption that American economic and strategic interests in the Middle
East were closer to those of Egypt than to those of Israel. Although US domestic support
for Israel was partly understood, Sadat emerged as the first Egyptian leader who believed
he could affect US domestic politics. As such, Sadat believed that his expulsion of Soviet
forces from Egyptian soil (1972), and his positive responsiveness toward Washington after
the 1973 war would present the United States with a strategic alternative to Israel. This
was especially so given the close relationship that Sadat had built with the leadership of
Saudi Arabia-an increasingly important state for the United States following the
quadrupling of oil prices in 1974-which manifested itself in the oil embargo of 1973-74.
Even in the Camp David negotiations, Sadat had reason to believe that Saudi Arabia
would remain “on board,” thus adding to his strategic weight with the United States.
President Jimmy Carter revealed recently that, in a private meeting with then Crown
Prince Fahd of Saudi Arabia, the latter assured him of Saudi support on the eve of the
1. See “Man of the Year,” Time, 2 January 1978.
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ARAB-ISRAELI NEGOTIATIONS * 381
Camp David Accords, and that Saudi leaders dispatched an immediate letter of
congratulations to him upon the completion of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty in 1979.2
From this perspective, Egypt expected an active American role in the negotiations as
a “partner,” not a mere “mediator” as Israel preferred. Whereas a mediator is concerned
with reaching any settlement agreeable to the parties, without much concern for the details
of the agreement, a partner has interests to advocate and would prefer certain outcomes
over others. Egypt’s expectation was that American strategic interests would translate into
pressure on Israel during the negotiations. As Butrus Butrus Ghali, then Egypt’s minister
of state for foreign affairs, saw it, the Egyptian competition with Israel for alliance with
the United States was the “most important leverage” that Egypt held in the negotiations,
and the “secret weapon that Israel feared most.”3
Israel, on the other hand, preferred a minimal American role in the negotiations,
given that, left alone with Egypt, it had a favorable military balance and it occupied
territories that Egypt wanted back. But Israel was also concerned about the strategic
competition that Egypt brought to the table beginning with the Soviet expulsion from
Egypt in 1972. Former Israeli Defense Minister Ezer Weizman wrote that “In driving out
the Russians from Egypt [Sadat] brought the West closer to him, thus necessarily diluting
its loyalty to US.”4 At Camp David, Weizman presented Israel’s concerns about an active
American role this way:
My objections to excessive American involvement in the negotiations with Egypt stemmed
from a simple consideration: I foresaw that US interests lay closer to Egypt’s than to ours, so
that it would not be long before Israeli negotiators would have to cope with the dual
confrontation as they face a Washington/Cairo axis.5
In fact, there was reason for such concern: Carter and Sadat had secretly agreed on
a joint strategy (that Carter apparently decided to ignore later) that would manipulate
Israel into accepting a settlement they considered acceptable.6 Israeli Prime Minister
Menahem Begin complained on the fourth day of the Camp David negotiations that “the
United States negotiators were all agreeing with the Egyptian demand that the Sinai
settlements be removed, and that this was no way for a mediating team to act.”7 He had
told Carter, upon arriving at Camp David, that the most important agreement he sought at
Camp David was with the United States, and that an Egyptian-Israeli agreement was of
“secondary” importance, although also crucial. “He wanted the whole world to know that
there were no differences between Israel and the United States.”8
Similarly, Sadat arrived at Camp David with the primary aim of building US-
Egyptian relations. He could afford failure of the negotiations with Israel as long as the
2. Jimmy Carter, “The Sadat Lecture for Peace,” University of Maryland, College Park, 25 October 1998.
3. Personal interview with the author, Cairo, 28 August 1983.
4. Ezer Weizman, The Battle for Peace (Toronto and New York: Bantam Books, 1981), p. 18.
5. Ibid, pp. 115-16.
6. William Quandt, Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution,
1986), p. 171.
7. Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President (Toronto and New York: Bantam Books,
1982), p. 365.
8. Ibid, p. 366.
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382 * MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL
failure would be blamed on Israel and would lead to closer US-Egyptian relations.
Apparently expecting failure at Camp David, he prepared his ambassadors on the eve of
his departure to Camp David for a post-failure offensive to place the blame squarely on
Israel.9
Carter and members of the US delegation fully understood that improved relations
with the United States was the big prize for which both Israel and Egypt were vying. Early
in the Camp David negotiations, when Carter believed that Menahem Begin was not
sufficiently compromising, he considered going to the American people with a speech that
blamed Israel for the failure. But on the eleventh day of the negotiations, when
Sadat-apparently expecting that Carter would blame Begin for the failure-packed his
bags to leave Camp David to protest Begin’s position, Carter warned him that “it will
mean first of all an end to the relationship between the United States and Egypt.”‘0 Sadat
quickly reversed his plans, and agreement was reached within two days.
In short, the role of the United States was indispensable in the Egyptian-Israeli
negotiations, not only because both sides believed that relations with the United States
were central for their foreign policies, but also because each believed that there was
serious room for competition for the prized relationship. This cannot be said for other
rounds of Arab-Israeli negotiations, beginning with the Madrid Conference in 1991.
Changing Perceptions of the US Role Since Madrid
As the United States organized the Madrid Conference between Israel, on the one
hand, and Lebanon, Syria, and a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation on the other, both Arabs
and Israelis held similar views of the American role in Middle East politics. Both sides
came to the table with minimal immediate expectations, and mostly because neither could
ignore the only remaining superpower, which had just won the 1991 Gulf War against
Iraq. And unlike Egypt in the 1970s, no Arab party believed it was in a position to
compete with Israel for a special relationship with the United States.
On the Arab side, there was a common interpretation of the consequences of the end
of the Cold War for Middle East politics. In general, most Arabs believed that the loss of
the Soviet Union as an ally and as a global counterweight to the United States was
detrimental to Arab interests. There was also a sense that the United States would continue
to pursue a policy that favored Israel because of the increasing dominance of domestic
American politics in the shaping of American foreign policy.” But for many Arab parties,
9. Author’s interview with a former aide to Sadat, Tahseen Bashir, Princeton, New Jersey, March 1984.
10. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux), p. 272.
11. To many Arabs, the end of the Cold War, which signaled the decline of the Soviet Union as a
superpower, ushered in an era of American hegemony that also entailed Israel’s regional hegemony. A common
Arab view was summarized by Iraqi President Saddam Husayn in a speech to the Arab Cooperation Council in
February 1990: “Given the relative erosion of the role of the Soviet Union as the key champion of the Arabs in
the context of the Arab-Zionist conflict and globally, and given that the influence of the Zionist lobby on US
policies is as powerful as ever, the Arabs must take into account that there is a real possibility that Israel might
embark on new stupidities within the five-year span I have mentioned. This might take place as a result of direct
or tacit US encouragement.” Quoted in Foreign Broadcast Information Service – Near East and South Asia (FBIS
-NES)-90, 27 February 1990. By the end of June 1990, following the suspension of the dialogue between the
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ARAB-ISRAELI NEGOTIATIONS * 383
especially Syria, it was better to be on the side of the only superpower, at least until the
global picture improved. There was also a general sense among Arab members of the
coalition against Iraq that President George Bush himself was more inclined than his
predecessors to be “fair” personally on Arab-Israeli issues, domestic politics notwith-
standing.
On the Israeli side, the strategic calculations of the government of Prime Minister
Yitzhak Shamir were not substantially different from those in the Arab world. The
consensus in Israel was that the end of the Cold War and the end of the Gulf War put Israel
in a very advantageous position. American foreign policy would be dominant in regional
politics, while domestic American politics would be increasingly dominant in shaping
American foreign policy. But the immediate problem for the Shamir government, which
came to Madrid reluctantly, was that the Bush Administration came out of the Gulf War
with great popularity, with President Bush enjoying 90 percent approval ratings in opinion
polls. Members of Shamir’s government further believed that Bush himself was “anti-
Israel.”1 2 In the end, both sides came to the negotiations as a way of deflecting pressure
at a moment of weakness as they perceived it: The Shamir government was concerned
about an undesirable US presidency and the Arab states were concerned about an
unfavorable distribution of power.
In the period between the Madrid Conference in 1991 and the Oslo Accord between
Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1993, Israeli and Arab views of
the United States changed somewhat. Part of this change was a result of the 1992 election
of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in Israel and President Bill Clinton in the United States,
each more closely sharing the strategic view of the other than their predecessors had:
Clinton with a more Israel-friendly agenda and the Rabin government with more
willingness to compromise in the negotiations. In contrast, the Arab side saw the early
days of the first Clinton Administration in negative terms. Indeed, the PLO, which in the
past saw Washington as the key to a deal with Israel, ultimately decided to negotiate
directly with Israel in Oslo without the United States, partly because it did not believe it
could get much out of the Clinton Administration.
The ascendance to power of the government of Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin
Netanyahu in 1996 resulted in yet another shift in the perceptions of both Arabs and
Israelis of the American role in the negotiations. Netanyahu, who had opposed the Oslo
agreements, came to power believing that the United States was not in a strong position
to pressure Israel. He certainly did not believe that the Clinton Administration was a friend
of his government, since it had allied itself with his Labor Party opponent in the elections,
Shimon Peres, and it was seen to have meddled in domestic Israeli politics. But Netanyahu
believed that the Clinton Administration had little incentive to press Israel, especially
United States and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), even Kuwaiti newspapers were calling on the
Arabs “to adopt serious and objective stands against the US which persists in a position hostile to the Arab
causes.” FBIS-NES-90-122, 25 June 1990. For a full discussion of this issue, see Shibley Telhami, “Arab Public
Opinion and the Gulf War,” Political Science Quarterly 108, no. 3 (Fall 1993).
12. For example, Rehav’am Ze’evi, a minister in the Israeli government, was quoted by Israel Radio
(Qol Yisrael) as having said: “Bush is hostile to Israel, his policy smacks of anti-Semitism. . .” FBIS-NES-91-
184, 23 September 1991, p. 46.
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384 * MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL
since he was confident about his ability to mobilize Congressional support for his
government. He had labored to build strong relations with Congressional Republicans and
had much personal experience in American politics.’3 His conclusion was probably this:
given the American dominance in the Gulf after the Gulf War, and the absence of the
Soviet alternative for the Arabs, an American president would certainly be more
responsive to members of Congress than to Arab leaders.
In this regard, the Netanyahu government believed not only that Arab leverage with
the United States diminished after the Gulf War in 1991, but also that Arab governments
now cared much less about the Palestinian issue. In his first year, he was confident that
lack of progress on the Palestinian-Israeli track would not jeopardize even Israel’s own
relations with other Arab states. Behind this conclusion lay not only the difficult relations
between the PLO and members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)’4 soon after the
Gulf War, because of the PLO’s position in support of Iraq during that war, but also a
general sense that American interests in the Gulf region were no longer linked to
American interests in the Arab-Israeli arena.
This issue of “linkage” had been at the heart of the American incentive to seek
actively a settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Besides containment of the Soviet Union
during the Cold War, US regional interests primarily pertained to oil and Israel. That the
two issues were linked was forcefully demonstrated in the Arab oil embargo that followed
the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. This linkage provided added incentive for American
diplomacy, not only by fueling the shuttle diplomacy of former Secretary of State Henry
Kissinger in 1974, but also by providing a sense that resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict
was a strategic interest for the United States, justifying the kind of presidential effort that
President Carter later employed to mediate between Israel and Egypt in the Camp David
negotiations.
But Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait propelled a different assessment, not only in Israel, but
also in the United States. In mobilizing support for its effort to oust Iraq from Kuwait, the
United States had every incentive to separate the war with Iraq from the continuing crisis
on the Israeli-Palestinian front, in order to prevent Iraq from exploiting any linkage.
Aiding the United States in making its case was the fact that Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait was
obviously not linked to the Arab-Israeli conflict, and that Arab members of the US-led
coalition also had incentives in minimizing the links between these issues, in order to
minimize domestic opposition to their policies.
The relative success in separating Gulf issues from Arab-Israeli issues during the
Gulf crisis created a sense that these issues were not, in fact, linked. But the difficulty the
United States ultimately faced in mobilizing support among GCC states for its policy
toward Iraq, and the growing hesitation in the Arab world in general to continue the trend
of normalization with Israel that followed the Oslo Accords, were increasingly seen to be
13. Netanyahu had served in the Israeli embassy in Washington from 1982-84 and as Israel’s
ambassador to the United Nations from 1984-88, during which time he built strong political ties in the United
States.
14. The membership of the GCC includes Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudia Arabia, and the United
Arab Emirates.
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ARAB-ISRAELI NEGOTIATIONS * 385
tied to the lack of progress on the Israeli-Palestinian front. By 1997, President Clinton
himself declared that the setbacks in the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations were complicating
US policy toward Iraq.15
The revived sense of linkage partly explains why neither Netanyahu nor Arab
analysts fully predicted American policy in the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations by simply
assessing the global configurations of forces or by reducing US domestic politics simply
to interest group politics. On the one hand, the predictions were broadly correct: the
strategic and economic American support for Israel continued and grew following the end
of the Cold War, seemingly unaffected by the ups and downs of the Arab-Israeli
negotiations. On the other hand, the United States did not always take Israel’s side in the
negotiations, and increasingly took public positions that were critical of Israel’s policies.
A gap, sometimes a large one, existed between Congressional positions, which were
predictably more supportive of the Netanyahu government, and the position of the
Administration.
Behind these tensions between the Clinton Administration and the Israeli government
were a number of factors. First, despite clear support for Israel in the United States,
presidents retain a certain leeway in foreign policy, and both President Bush and President
Clinton demonstrated this in their policies toward Israel. Second, although US interests in
the Gulf were theoretically easier to manage in the absence of a perceived Soviet threat
and with the presence of dominant American forces in the region, the very presence of
these forces in the Gulf, and the occasional need to employ them, became a new interest
for the United States that required the cooperation of Arab states. Given the revival of
“linkage,” weakened as this may have been, no US president could ignore these external
issues. Third, a second-term president is always more sensitive to intemational issues than
a first-term president, not only because of the relative absence of electoral pressures, but
also because of increased familiarity with the issues, as well as the need to keep
commitments that a president will have made to foreign leaders. The fact that Clinton was
the US president to host the signing of the Oslo Accords, for example, is relevant as an
explanation of the degree to which he would work to implement these Accords. Finally,
the domestic context of US policy toward the Middle East has changed since the Oslo
Accords. The American Jewish community, never a monolith, became even more divided
on US policy toward the peace process, with many Clinton supporters urging him to be
tough with the Netanyahu government, even as others advised him in the opposite
direction.
One might ask if such “leeway” available to a president matters at all in the big
picture, given that the strategic, political, and economic relationship with Israel remains
15. Speaking at the White House on 21 November 1997, President Clinton put it this way: “In recent
weeks, as Iraq has challenged the United Nations, we have been reminded again of how vital it is to continue
forging a community of shared values throughout the region to strengthen the bonds among all people who
oppose intimidation and terror, and how we will never, ever do that until there is peace between Israel and her
neighbors; and that the absence of that peace makes the other difficulties, tensions and frustrations all the more
troubling because it compounds them and undermines our ability to seek a unified solution.” White House,
“Remarks by the President at the Rabin-Peres Award Luncheon.”
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386 * MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL
unaltered. Do nice words toward Palestinian leader Yasir ‘Arafat, or criticism of Israel’s
settlement policy matter if they lead to no further action?
Evidence suggests that this “leeway” matters. It is conventional wisdom, for
example, that the Bush Administration’s linkage of loan-guarantees to Israel with the
settlement policy of the government of Yitzhak Shamir contributed to the downfall of that
government in the 1992 Israeli elections. And Netanyahu’s forced decision to hold early
elections in 1999 was in large part driven by tensions within the government coalition over
the US-mediated Wye River agreements. In the end, the degree of American-Palestinian
cooperation will be an important factor in the outcome of the final status negotiations
between Israel and the Palestinians, not because the Palestinians could ever compete with
Israel in terms of close relations with the United States, but because having hostile
relations with the United States would gain them much less.
Projecting “Optimism” and “Pessimism” as a Negotiating Tactic
Arabs and Israelis have often employed “optimism” and “pessimism” as instruments
of bargaining, especially in their attempts to affect the American role. In the run-up to the
Camp David conference, Egypt consistently projected a “pessimistic” outlook on the state
of the negotiations, so as to compel American intervention, while Israel sought the reverse.
In the Madrid negotiations, this tactic remained a favored method of manipulating US
reaction.
Even as the Madrid negotiations turned serious in 1992 with the ascendance of the
Labor government to power in Israel, the gap in the parties’ positions remained large; how
much each party would ultimately get was seen to depend on the role of the United States.
From the point of view of Israel, the less involved the United States was in the
negotiations the better, so long as American economic and military aid kept coming-and
there was no reason to expect otherwise, especially with the election of Bill Clinton as
president. Arabs, on the other hand, continued to prefer an active American role, since the
local military and political balance favored Israel.
The extent of American involvement in the negotiations has been partly a function of
the degree of perceived progress, and partly one of assigning blame for lack of progress.
To secure the greatest degree of US involvement in the negotiations, Arab parties have had
an interest in projecting stalemate and some pessimism. To reduce the extent of the
American role (or, American pressure), Israel has had an incentive to project a great deal
of optimism. But each side has had to vary its projections somewhat because neither has
wanted to be blamed for lack of progress. With Yitzhak Rabin as prime minister of Israel,
the Arabs started with a tactical handicap in the game. The very fact that, across the table,
sat negotiators representing an Israeli government with an image of willingness to
compromise, especially when contrasted with the previous government, shifted the burden
to the Arab side to show some conciliatory gestures. No matter what Israel proposed, Arab
negotiators could not constantly express pessimism and gloom, lest they be accused of not
trying. For their part, the Israelis simultaneously sought to limit American involvement by
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ARAB-ISRAELI NEGOTIATIONS * 387
indicating movement in the negotiations, and to protect their new conciliatory image so as
not to jeopardize a package of $10 billion in loan guarantees to help Israel absorb new
immigrants from the former Soviet Union.
But the role of the United States in this game of perceptions was only one part of the
story. The other part had to do with the reality that the “Arabs” were not one, but many.
This of course had always been true, even in the days of the common rhetoric of
pan-Arabism and unity. Still, most Arabs understood that their hands would be
strengthened if they cooperated with each other in dealing with Israel. Israel, on the other
hand, sought to conduct bilateral negotiations with each Arab state so as to limit Arab
leverage. Ultimately, Israel won out on this issue when the Madrid negotiations were
organized into simultaneous but bilateral sets of talks, although some issues were to be
dealt with in “multilateral working groups.” Three central Arab delegations emerged in
these negotiations: Lebanese, Syrian, and Palestinian-Jordanian. But the most difficult
issues clearly related to Syria and the Palestinians.
The Israeli government of Prime Minister Rabin came to the negotiating table with
clear priorities that contrasted sharply with those of its Likud predecessor; Rabin preferred
an agreement with the Palestinians before an agreement with Syria. Yet, for tactical
reasons, exactly the opposite priorities were projected as soon as the negotiations began.
Contrasting the preferences and the tactical behavior of the two Israeli governments
is especially telling. When former Prime Minister Shamir concluded that, because of
American determination, he could not avoid the Madrid process, he set for himself a clear
agenda. He would use the negotiations to hammer out a bilateral agreement with Syria and
stall on the Palestinian question. One Likud Party leader, Binyamin Begin, expressed the
government’s priorities this way: “the problem is with [the Arab states] rather than with
[Palestinian] Arabs west of the Jordan River.”’16
The source of the Likud agenda was clear: On the one hand, they were ideologically
committed to retaining the West Bank (“Judea and Samaria”); on the other hand,
following the defeat of Iraq in the Gulf War, Syria emerged as the most important Arab
military power. Sensing the vulnerability of Syria, due to the decline of its former ally, the
Soviet Union, and having watched the devastation of Iraq’s military, the Israelis thought
a bilateral deal was possible. With an Israeli-Syrian agreement, the Likud government
would have fewer constraints in its ambition to control the West Bank.
Once the Madrid process began, the Israeli delegation projected exactly the opposite
priorities. On the eve of the negotiations, former Defense Minister Moshe Arens declared
on American television that he now was “optimistic” about a deal with the Palestinians,
while a Palestinian leader praised “the new tone from Israel.”‘7 In the first sessions of the
conference, the negotiations with the Palestinian-Jordanian delegation exhibited a concil-
iatory tone while the Israeli-Syrian talks were full of recriminations bordering on
obscenities.
16. Interview with the author, 15 July 1991, Knesset building, Jerusalem.
17. New York Times, 30 October 1991.
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388 * MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL
These moves were clearly bargaining tactics. For their part, the Syrians understood
Israel’s priorities. Preferring not to deal with Israel alone, they managed to forge a
cooperative relationship with the Lebanese, the Palestinians, and the Jordanians, and they
toughened their rhetoric on the eve of the negotiations. Meeting in Syria on the eve of the
Madrid conference, representatives of Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, Egypt, and the PLO agreed
to “guarantee a unified Arab stand throughout all the phases of the conference and the
talks that complement it.”‘l8
Facing the possibility of strategic coordination between the Arab delegations that
could prevent independent bilateral agreements, the Israeli government of Yitzhak Shamir
expressed optimism on the Palestinian question, hoping to lure Palestinians away from the
Syrians. In frustration, the Syrians could then be open to a bilateral pact with Israel.
When the Likud government’s priorities became clear in Israel, leaders of the Labor
Party, including Rabin, cried foul. They criticized the Israeli government for planning to
rush into an agreement with Syria that could jeopardize Israeli security while ignoring the
more pressing Palestinian question; they accused the Likud government of sacrificing
security and economic welfare for ideology. One Labor leader, Ephraim Sneh, put it this
way: “I am ready for far-reaching concessions on the Palestinian issue, but less ready on
security questions with Syria. I’m not in a hurry to make peace with Syria.”‘9
When Labor finally got the chance to try its hand at the table, it clearly sought a deal
with the Palestinians first. But the Palestinians, for their part, continued to coordinate their
moves with other Arab parties and demanded much more than Rabin was willing to offer.
To get the Palestinians to cooperate, Rabin’s tactics were exactly the opposite of his real
priorities.
For starters, Rabin kept the Likud-appointed negotiator, Elyakim Rubinstein, who
was unpopular with the Palestinians, as head of the team negotiating with the Palestinian-
Jordanian delegation. In contrast, he installed the respected and conciliatory Israeli
scholar, Itamar Rabinovich, to negotiate with the Syrians. The Syrians decided to play
along, partly because they were under pressure to show some gestures, and partly because
they feared a bilateral Israeli-Palestinian deal. From there, expressions of optimism and
pessimism were easy to anticipate.
The secret contacts between the Israeli government and the PLO leading to the Oslo
Accords ultimately changed the degree to which Israel could play one negotiating front
against another. Still, there was much room for maneuver as Rabin continued this tactic.
But when Netanyahu was elected prime minister of Israel in 1996, on a platform that ruled
out full Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights, Israeli-Syrian negotiations were
frozen-and so were the multilateral Middle East negotiations. The Israeli ability to use
one front of negotiations to affect the other all but disappeared. The Israeli-Palestinian
negotiations became the only place to measure progress in Arab-Israeli negotiations.
18. New York Times, 25 October 1991.
19. Interview with the author, Tel Aviv, 17 July 1991.
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ARAB-ISRAELI NEGOTIATIONS * 389
THE PERCEPTION OF THE OTHER PARTY’S DOMESTIC POLITICS
For many years, both Israelis and Arabs underestimated the influence of each other’s
domestic politics on foreign policy. In one of the early sessions during the Camp David
conference, for example, Sadat explained to Begin that Egyptian public opinion would not
allow him to make the kind of concessions that Israel was demanding. Begin rejected
Sadat’s explanation on the grounds that “the people of Egypt could be easily manipulated
by Sadat, and their beliefs and attitudes could be shaped by their leader.”20 Begin went on
to cite Sadat’s ability to convince his people that the Soviets were their best friends, only
later to cast them as their worst enemies.2’ From that point on, Sadat and Begin had to be
separated throughout the negotiations until an agreement was finally reached.
This Israeli perception that the autocratic nature of Arab governments made domestic
politics irrelevant to the negotiations was bolstered by the absence of the kind of public
upheavals in the Arab world that many scholars had predicted following the 1991 Gulf
War, and by an increasing acceptance of this same thesis in Washington.
On the Arab side, there has been a prevailing assumption that little difference existed
between the two dominant parties in Israel, and that domestic politics were employed by
Israeli governments to justify intransigence. During the Camp David negotiations, for
example, Egypt did not believe that Israel’s concern for public opposition to the
dismantlement of settlements in the Sinai was more than a ploy intended to minimize
Israeli concessions.22
These perceptions began breaking down on a significant scale among Palestinian
leaders after the 1991 Gulf War. But for much of the period of negotiations between Israel
and Syria, and to some extent between Israel and the Palestinians, the perception remained
that little difference existed in the foreign policy aims of Labor and Likud, except perhaps
tactically.
The assassination of Prime Minister Rabin by a militant Israeli opposed to Rabin’s
peace policies did much to change Arab perceptions, but many in the Arab world
continued to believe that differences within Israel were minor. This entrenched view
propelled American diplomacy to highlight the potential differences between a Likud
government and the existing government of Shimon Peres on the eve of the 1996 Israeli
elections. The rhetoric of American diplomacy highlighted the conflict between “support-
ers of peace and opponents of peace” on both sides. Implicitly, the Likud Party in Israel,
which opposed the Oslo Accords, fell on the “opponents” side of the divide. As Israeli
troops moved into Lebanese territory on a large scale in the spring of 1996, in an operation
that led to the death of dozens at Qana, the US government asked Arab negotiating
partners to show restraint, on the grounds that this operation could help prevent the
electoral success of Netanyahu. In the process, US diplomacy intensified its efforts to
20. Carter, Keeping Faith, p. 358.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid. Sadat told Carter that the Israelis were “willing to give back the Sinai to [him] in exchange for
the West Bank,” (p. 361). Carter himself shared the view that Begin “would do almost anything concerning the
Sinai and other issues in order to protect Israel’s presence in ‘Judea and Samaria,”‘ (p. 348).
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390 * MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL
persuade Arabs that the differences between Labor and Likud were consequential. By the
eve of the elections, the United States appeared to have succeeded, as Syria’s Foreign
Minister Faruq al-Shar’a expressed his preference for Peres. This was enough for
Netanyahu to charge that Peres was Syria’s candidate, suggesting that Peres would give
more to the Arabs in the negotiations. This American success also made the rehabilitation
of Netanyahu in Arab eyes an uphill battle following his surprise victory in the election.
On the Israeli side, a more differentiated view of Palestinian domestic politics
certainly began with the rise of Hamas as an alternative to the PLO, and the moves leading
to Oslo were in part driven by Israel’s desire to prevent Hamas from taking over in the
West Bank and Gaza.23 In general, however, the prevailing view in Israel remained that
public opinion was less important for Arab politics, either because Arab leaders could help
shape the opinions of their publics, or because they could ignore them even if they could
not shape them. This view has become difficult to sustain over the past several years.
First, it is clear that Arab governments have increasingly lost control over the media
within their own polities. The spread of satellite technology, and the emergence of some
relatively independent media with broad regional reach has guaranteed that no one in the
region has a monopoly on information. Second, although governments can disregard their
publics most of the time, public opinion has proven important in affecting some
government decisions, such as the boycott of the Middle East-North Africa Economic
Conference at Doha, Qatar, in 1997. More importantly, the weight of public opinion,
especially elite opinion, has affected Arab-Israeli relations, despite the peace agreements
signed by governments. Jordanian and Egyptian elites, for example, have been able to
block fuller normalization of relations with Israel through social and public pressure. In
short both Israelis and Arabs have been slow to recognize the growing importance of
domestic politics for the foreign policy of the other.
Domestic Politics and Bargaining
In a previous work, the author argued that centralized governments are not as
effective in international bargaining as less centralized ones.24 In particular, Israel’s
23. The logic for the Israel-PLO conciliation began emerging in March 1993, in Rome. The contacts
came as attacks against Israelis by Islamist groups escalated, especially in Gaza, during Labor’s first year in
office, and progress in the Madrid process was slow. Some Labor leaders, pessimistic about immediate prospects
for an agreement with the Palestinians, were considering a unilateral Israeli withdrawal from Gaza. One of the
groups that brought PLO officials and Israelis together behind the scenes, a study group of the American
Academy of Arts and Sciences, met in Rome in March 1993 (a meeting which the author attended). A leading
Israeli, General Shlomo Gazit, brought a proposal for unilateral Israeli pullout for the group to discuss, because
Israel was eager to exit Gaza even in the absence of agreement, but was fearful of the rise of Hamas or of
complete disorder. The agenda was preempted by a surprise announcement by the PLO official present. The PLO,
he announced, was now ready for a “Gaza-first” agreement with Israel on two conditions: the PLO would take
over directly in areas evacuated by Israel, and “concrete” gestures would be made to indicate that there would
be an eventual link between Gaza and the West Bank, that a “Gaza first” is not a “Gaza only” agreement. He
explained that he was as eager as the Israelis to control the rising power of Hamas before it was too late. The
mutual advantages of such exchange became instantly clear.
24. Shibley Telhami, Power and Leadership in International Bargaining: the Path to the Camp David
Accords (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990).
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ARAB-ISRAELI NEGOTIATIONS * 391
decentralized government enabled its leadership to extract more concessions from Egypt’s
centralized government on some issues, even if one took into account that Israel had more
objective leverage than Egypt held at Camp David. This is because centralized govern-
ments lack effective hierarchies to minimize leaders’ mistakes and to provide fall-back
positions when mistakes do occur. In Israel’s case, the prime minister, Menahem Begin,
preferred not to negotiate directly, could not fully disregard his Cabinet members, and
ultimately could use Knesset ratification as a lever. In the case of the Egyptian president,
American negotiators could go to him directly to extract concessions, and he very often
overruled his aides in making concessions. Carter argued that, for all his strengths, Sadat
was too immune to internal criticism for his own good.25
Although this same structural weakness could have affected Syrian negotiations as
well, President Hafiz al-Asad’s personal style, his remoteness from routine negotiations,
and his complete insulation from Israeli leaders, have minimized the negative consequenc-
es-although this same cautious style may have also prevented the exploitation of a
possible agreement with the Rabin government.26 The unique case in this regard, however,
is the case of the Palestinians.
When the Madrid Conference began on 30 October 1991, the Palestinian team had
an accidental structure that was hierarchical and less inclined to make mistakes. This
structure was, in part, the inadvertent consequence of the Israeli government’s insistence
that the PLO be excluded from the negotiations. The outcome was that the PLO, which
remained the invisible power behind the Palestinian delegation, made all the final
decisions, while distinguished Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza conducted the
routine negotiations. The further exclusion of Palestinians from East Jerusalem who were
at the top of the local Palestinian leadership, created a second tier of negotiators, as these
leaders accompanied the negotiators as advisors, but did not attend the sessions. The final
decisions belonged to the PLO leadership and its chairman Yasir ‘Arafat. While this
arrangement minimized mistakes, it also encouraged stalemate.
Ultimately, it was partly this realization that propelled the Rabin government to seek
direct contact with the PLO. As Israeli negotiator Uri Savir pointed out, the local
Palestinian negotiators were simply receiving orders from the PLO anyway; “we were
actually negotiating with Yasir ‘Arafat by fax,” at the same time that the PLO’s weakness
after the Gulf War made it more willing to compromise.27
Once the 1993 Oslo Accords were concluded, the Palestinian team resembled the
typical team of a centralized polity. Rabin, Peres, and American negotiators had direct
access to ‘Arafat when needed, as his aides could be easily bypassed. But the difficult
relationship that emerged between ‘Arafat and Netanyahu, following the latter’s election,
once again created, inadvertently, a tier of separation that minimized Netanyahu’s ability
to have direct influence with ‘Arafat.
25. “The Sadat Lecture for Peace,” University of Maryland, 25 October 1998.
26. For a good account of these negotiations, see Itamar Rabinovich, The Brink of Peace: The
Israeli-Syrian Negotiations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998).
27. Uri Savir, The Process: 1,100 Days That Changed the Middle East (New York: Random House,
1998), p. 5.
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392 U MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL
CONCLUSION
It should be clear from the discussion above that Arab-Israeli negotiations, and the
role of the United States in these negotiations, have been affected by the tactics of the
parties, and that these tactics have not always been adjusted quickly to changes in the
domestic politics of the key actors. Although the contours of Arab-Israeli negotiations,
and the US role in these negotiations, remain a function of relative power, it is evident that
much of what has happened in those negotiations has been a function of domestic politics,
and the effectiveness of each party in understanding and adjusting to change in domestic
politics.
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Contents
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Issue Table of Contents
The Middle East Journal, Vol. 53, No. 3, Special Issue on Israel (Summer, 1999), pp. 355-520
Front Matter
Editor’s Note [pp. 355-356]
Guest Editor’s Note: The Significance of Israel [pp. 357-363]
The United States and Israel: Evolution of an Unwritten Alliance [pp. 364-378]
From Camp David to Wye: Changing Assumptions in Arab-Israeli Negotiations [pp. 379-392]
From Conflict to Peace? Israel’s Relations with Syria and the Palestinians [pp. 393-416]
Israel as a Non-Arab State: The Political Implications of Mass Immigration of Non-Jews [pp. 417-433]
Fifty Years of Israeli Security: The Central Role of the Defense System [pp. 434-442]
Chronology January 16, 1999-April 15, 1999 [pp. 443-466]
Book Reviews
Review: Israel’s Labor Government Talks to Its Neighbors: Lessons from Two Participants’ Memoirs: Review Article [pp. 467-469]
Afghanistan
Review: untitled [pp. 470-471]
The Gulf
Review: untitled [pp. 471-472]
Iraq
Review: untitled [pp. 472-474]
Review: untitled [pp. 474-475]
Israel
Review: untitled [pp. 475-476]
Review: untitled [pp. 476-477]
Review: untitled [pp. 477-478]
Review: untitled [pp. 478-480]
Review: untitled [pp. 480-481]
Review: untitled [p. 482]
Palestine and Palestinians
Review: untitled [pp. 482-484]
Review: untitled [pp. 484-485]
Turkey
Review: untitled [pp. 485-486]
Review: untitled [pp. 486-488]
Yemen
Review: untitled [pp. 488-489]
Autobiography
Review: untitled [pp. 489-491]
Law
Review: untitled [pp. 491-492]
Literature
Review: untitled [pp. 492-493]
Modern History and Politics
Review: untitled [pp. 493-495]
Review: untitled [pp. 495-496]
Review: untitled [pp. 496-497]
Review: untitled [pp. 497-498]
Philsophy, Religion and Science
Review: untitled [pp. 498-500]
Social Conditions
Review: untitled [pp. 500-501]
Women
Review: untitled [pp. 501-502]
Recent Publications [pp. 502-511]
Bibliography of Periodical Literature [pp. 512-520]
Back Matter
Barbara Kellerman
Author of Bad Leadership
Desiree Benson EADM 892.3
November 25th, 2018
University of Saskatchewan
Followership
HOW FOLLOWERS ARE CREATING CHANGE
AND CHANGING LEADERS
Barbara Kellerman wrote this book on the importance of followers on follow-
ership. Her book provides a sweeping view of followers, as they relate to their
leaders and to each other. Kellerman’s perspective on followers and follow-
ership is not from the leader-centric approach as her focus is on followers as
followers are getting bolder and more strategic.
She includes stories about a range of people and places in different times in
history which she then makes distinctions among five different types of follow-
ers. Isolates, Bystanders, Participants, Activists, and Diehards who are all
grouped together by levels of engagement. Kellerman describes each type of
follower by how withdrawn, committed, and engaged they are to their leader
and if they support or oppose their leaders.
In her book, Kellerman analyses followership and how people with no apparent
power, authority, or influence have an impact on those with more power and
authority. With certain changes in technology Kellerman explains how follow-
ers are more important now than ever before.
“More than ever, good leaders depend on good followers.”
-Joseph S. Nye Jr.
“At long last, followership bril-
liantly comes to its own-as leader-
ship. Kellerman is noted for her
original and arresting studies in
leadership: in Followership, a
book rich with historical exam-
ples and real-life situations, she
offers bold new ideas about the
leader-follower interaction.”
-James MacGregor Burns
INSIDE THIS ISSUE
Seeing Followers ………………………. 2
Inside Story ……………………………… 3
Being a Follower ……………………….. 4
Inside Story ……………………………… 5
Future Followers ………………………. 5
About the author ………………………. 6
“Followers are subordinates who have less power, authority, and influ-
ence than do their superiors and who therefore usually, but not invaria-
bly, fall into line.” (p. xix)
In this part in the book, Kellerman gives some background knowledge on leadership and
followership. She explains how certain times in history has changed the idea and concept
of followership. During these changes in history, followers began to lead in a more ag-
gressive way than they did before and with more power, influence, and authority.
In 2002 Audi came out with a slogan with the tagline “Never Follow” which was a cam-
paign to advertise that Audi cars were better than their competition and to embrace a
“never follow” approach and that to be a follower is only second best to the leader (p. 4).
The term follower has historically been considered something of an insult and has been
shunned by those in the leadership field and the term suggested too much passivity and
dependence (p. 6). Kellerman argues the importance of being a follower and that leaders
generally have more power, authority, and influence than do followers but leaders and
followers are dependent on each other (p. 9). She explains how leaders and followers are
inextricably enmeshed and each is defined by and dependent on the other (p. 9).
Kellerman uses the history of Nazi Germany and how Hitler was responsible for the Sec-
ond World War and how millions died including six million Jews who were massacred by
Hitler’s followers who were his willing executioners (p. 9). Hitler’s followers were willing
executioners who would die following him and also who did nothing while people and
places were destroyed. His orders were obeyed directly and indirectly and with this it is
clear that those who obey orders play as important a role in human affairs as those who
issue them (p. 14).
The American and French Revolutions were part of the change seen in followers who had
less power, authority, and influence but initiated a change and motivated others to create
this change. Martin Luther King’s Civil Rights Movement was part of this change in the
1950’s-60’s. Kellerman discusses this time in history where Martin Luther King believed
in nonviolence to set the tone for movement which then created the Civil Rights Act and
voting rights for African Americans. Martin Luther King was a follower who was not in a
position of power or authority initiated a change and who had the followers to create this
change in history.
SEEING THE FOLLOWERS
FICTIONS AND FACTS
In this section, Kellerman discusses
how followers formally have been
designated in organizational hierar-
chies in which those at the bottom
and in the middle are clearly subordi-
nate to those in higher up positions
(p. xx).
Kellerman defines followers as
“unleaders” who are without particu-
lar power, without positions of au-
thority, and without special influence
(p. xx).
She gives a few definitions of the term
leadership as there are many differ-
ent definitions that have been used
to describe people in leadership posi-
tions.
Leadership is described in the book
as being a leader in a position of au-
thority who may get what they want
and intend by any means necessary
(p. xx).
Kellerman does define followership
as “followership implies a relation-
ship (rank), between subordinates
and superiors, and a response
(behavior), of the former to the latter
(p. xx).
INSIDE STORY
HEADLINE
In this section of the book Keller-
man discusses times in history
where the relationship between
leadership and followership has
emerged.
Kellerman goes back in time to the
mid 1700’s to explain that Ameri-
cans have always assumed their
way of doing things would never be
challenged and that they were
content living in societies where
some people were rich and some
poor, some honored and some
obscure, some powerful and some
weak (p. 4).
At a time in history being a follow-
er was considered necessary and
appropriate and was viewed as
being obedient.
“Thinking leadership without
thinking followership is not merely
misleading, it is mistaken.” (p. 23).
In the 21st century times have
changed and followers have more
of a say than they ever did before
(p. 25).
2
RELATIONSHIPS AND TYPES
Kellerman discusses past and present types of followers and distinguishes characteristics
that followers may have. She explains that Harvard Business School Professor Abraham
Zaleznik put followers into four types the first being the Impulsive Subordinate who are
rebellious. They challenge people in positions of authority, they can be constructive,
spontaneous, courageous, they have an urge to create and achieve, and they can influence
events. The second type is the Compulsive Subordinate who seek to control people in
positions of authority through “passive means”. They have strong guilt feelings that de-
rive from their wish to dominate. The third type of follower is the Masochistic Subordi-
nates w h o w a n t to b e in pa in b y s u b m ittin g to th e co n tr o l a n d a s s e r tive n e s s
of the authority figure, and who deliberately if unconsciously, perform poorly. The fourth
type are the Withdrawn Subordinates who care little or not at all about what happens at
work and they behave accordingly. They see the world as malevolent and unforgiving and
they have a lack of trust, interest and involvement. (p. 77). Kellerman shares Zaleznik’s
four types of followers because he was a pioneer of leadership and management who
pointed out the distinctions and importance of followers.
Kellerman discusses another perspective on followers with Robert Kelley’s five follow-
ership styles. Kelly wrote a book titled The Power of Followership in 1992 which was
motivated by the interest in followers. The first type of follower that Kelly describes is
that of the Alienated Follower s who think freely and critically, they do not participate in
the groups and organization of which they are members. The second type of followers
are the Exemplary Followers who perform well in every aspect, they exercise independent
and critical thinking separate from the leader or group. The third type of followers are the
Conformist Followers w h o a r e c o n te n t to ta k e o r d e r s to d e fe r to th e ir lea d –
ers. The fourth type of followers are the Passive Followers who let their leaders do the
thinking for them and they require constant supervision. The fifth type of follows are the
Pragmatist Followers w h o h u g th e m id d le o f th e r o a d m e a n in g th ey q u e s tio n
their leader’s decisions but not too often or not too critically. ( p. 81, 82). Kelley believed
that followers were actively engaged in helping their organizations succeed while at the
same time independent operators (p. 82).
Kellerman also discussed Ira Chaleff’s followership styles in her book. Chaleff wrote a
book titled The Courageous Follower in 1995 which distinguished followers into four
categories with the first being the Implementers who are dependable, supportive, and
considerate. Partners are goal-orientated risk takers. Individualists are independent, self
-assured, and forthright and are Resources are available to their leaders but not commit-
ted to them (p. 83, 84).
Kellerman uses these types of followers from Zaleznik, Kelley, and Chaleff to come up
with her own types of followers model based on their level of engagement.
HOW DO LEADERS
AND FOLLOWERS RE-
LATE?
In this section in the book, Kellerman
discusses the different types of follow-
ers.
There are rewards and benefits of
leading such as power, influence,
status, and access to money and re-
sources and Kellerman explains that
followers also reap benefits and re-
wards. Followers may follow leaders
who they admire and who they aspire
to be but they might also follow leaders
when neither applies (p. 49). Follow-
ers still go along with leaders who they
do not admire or aspire to be which
Kellerman explains they do for self-
interest and the cost of resisting is
higher than the cost of going along (p.
49).
Why we follow-individual bene-
fits
Kellerman explains that followers
follow their leaders for individual
benefits. It provides us with stability
and security and we expect our leaders
to provide us with the comfort of com-
munity (p. 55). Our needs and wants
as individuals are met by playing the
part of a follower most of the time and
that we consciously or unconsciously
determine it in our interest to do so (p.
55).
“Followers follow not only because it is
in their interest to conform to their
leaders, but also because it is in their
interest to conform to their fellow
followers” (p. 56).
Why we follow-group benefits
Kellerman explains that there are
group benefits to why groups follow
their leaders: 1) leaders provide groups
with structure; 2) leaders provide
groups with a goal; 3) leaders provide
groups with instruments of goal
achievement (p. 59).
Follower-leader relations
“Leaders, in responding to their own
motives, appeal to the motives of
potential followers. As followers re-
spond, a symbiotic relationship devel-
ops that binds leader and follower
together (p. 67).
Contexts and characters
The context is critical in how followers
and leaders relate and “the relationship
between superior and subordinate is to
some degree the same in every
group” (p. 67).
Kellerman’s Five Types of Followers:
Isolates, Bystanders, Participants, Activists, Diehards
3
INSIDE STORY
HEADLINE
In this part of the book, Keller-
man discusses the different
types of followers which are in
some way engaged, they are
engaged with their leaders,
with other followers, and with
the group or organization they
are embedded to (p. 90).
Bystanders are free riders, who
are content to let others make
the group’s decisions and do
the groups work (p. 97)
Participants are those who
while generally supportive of
their leader and of the organi-
zation of which they are mem-
bers, nevertheless go their own
way (p. 126).
BEING A FOLLOWER
“Bystanders observe but do not participate. They make deliberate decision to
stand aside, to disengage from their leaders and from whatever is the group
dynamic. This withdrawal is, in effect, a declaration of neutrality that amounts
to tacit support fro whoever and whatever constitutes the status quo” (p. 92).
“Participants are in some way engaged. They clearly favor their leaders and the
groups and organizations of which they are members—or they are clearly op-
posed. In either case, they care enough to put their money where their mouths
are—that is, to invest some of what they have (time for example) to try to have
an impact” (p. 92).
Kellerman discusses parts in history which connect times in the past to her five
types of followers. She connects Bystanders to Nazi Germany and Hitler and
how Hitler had followers who stood by and did nothing as millions of people
were killed. She connects Participants to Merck a pharmaceutical company
that created an arthritis drug which caused heart attacks in people. She con-
nects Activists to the Voice of the Faithful (VOTF) which was a movement that
started in 2002 to bring to life allegations of clerical abuse of children. Keller-
man connects Diehards Afghanistan which has history in war dating back to
1979.
Kellerman explains in detail how these times in history connect to her five types
of followers.
Isolates, Bystanders, Participants, Activists, and Diehards
Kellerman’s point of view for this section
is that we are followers and that we may
not follow all of the time but that some-
times we lead, but all of us follow some
of the time, it’s the human condition (p.
93).
“Nothing appears more surprising to
those who consider human affairs with a
philosophical eye than the easiness with
which the many are governed by the few,
and the implicit submission with which
men resign their own sentiments and
passions to those of their rulers” -David
Hume (p. 96).
Kellerman makes her bias clear that she
is against followers who stand by and do
nothing when lives are at risk (p. 97).
She explains that it is individual respon-
sibility for what happens, we are our
brother’s keeper and once the habit of
standing by and doing nothing is devel-
oped that it is difficult to break (p. 123).
Kellerman explains that leaders want
followers who are participants and as-
suming they are in support rather than
opposition, participants are the fuel that
drives the engine (p. 125).
Participants provide the energy that
makes for a good group or organization
which in turn enables leaders to do what
they want and need (p. 125).
Kellerman explains that followers matter
even when they do nothing and followers
matter when they are part of the pro-
cess.
BYSTANDERS AND PARTICIPANTS
4
“The fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars, but in ourselves, that we are
underlings.”
-Shakespeare
“Activists feel strongly about their leaders and they act accordingly.
They are eager, energetic, and engaged. Because they are heavily in-
vested in people and process, they work hard either on behalf of their
leaders or to undermine and even unseat them” (p. 92).
“Diehards are as their name implies—prepared to die if necessary for
their cause, whether an individual, or an idea, or both. Diehards are
deeply devoted to their leaders; or, in contrast, they are ready to re-
move them from positions of power, authority, and influence by any
means necessary. Diehards are defined by their dedication, including
their willingness to risk life and limb. Being a diehard is all-consuming.
It is who you are. It determines what you do” (p. 92).
Good followers are the an-
tithesis of bad followers and
good followers support good
leaders who are effective
and ethical (p. 234).
Like good leaders, good fol-
lowers should be informed,
energetic, and independent
and should have the capaci-
ty to cope with complexity,
manage change, and exer-
cise good judgement (p.
236).
The shift away from leaders
and toward followers with
growing demands and high-
er expectations is by and
large a positive develop-
ment and it is also a major
development (p. 261).
ACTIVISTS AND DIEHARDS
FUTURE FOLLOWERS
5
About the author
Barbara Kellerman is the
author of Followership: How
Followers are Creating
Change and Changing Lead-
ers. She is also the a uthor of
Bad Leadership a nd has
written numerous books on
leadership, followership and
the dynamics in creating
change in organizations.
Barbara is the James Mac-
Gregor Burns Lecturer in
Public Leadership at Har-
vard’s John F. Kennedy
School of Government. Be-
yond books, Barbara has
written for Harvard Business
Review, the New York Times,
the Washington Post, and
many other publications.
CRITICAL EVALUATION
Critical evaluation: Barbara Kellerman has
done a great job writing about follow-
ership and the need to have a better un-
derstanding of the importance of followers
and followership. Her book does not focus
on leader as she explained the focus has
always been on the leaders and follow-
ership and followers have been neglected
from past research. She makes it clear to
not forget about the leader but the need to
broaden the research on followers and
followership. She believes in the im-
portance of being a follower and that fol-
lowers are just as important as the leader, they have always been strong forces,
and in the 21st century they are becoming , will be and are more important than
they have ever been before. Followers can be and now are agents of change.
Other Leadership Books by Barbara Kellerman
The End of Leadership (2012)
Leadership: Essential Selections on Power, Authority, and
Influence (2010)
Women & Leadership: The State of Play and Strategies for Change,
coeditor with Deborah Rhode (2007)
Bad Leadership: What It Is, How It Happens, Why It Matters
(2004)
Reinventing Leadership: Making the Connection Between Politics
and Business (1999)
The President as World Leader, coauthored w ith Ryan Barilleaux
(1991)
Leadership and Negotiation in the Middle East, coauthored w ith
Jeffrey Z. Rubin (1988)
Political Leadership: A Source Book, editor (1986)
Women Leaders in American Politics, coauthored with James
David Barber (1986)
The Political Presidency: Practice of Leadership (1984).
Leadership: Multidisciplinary Perspectives, editor (1984)
Barbara Kellerman’s newest book
The End of Leadership (2012)
